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A Room with Many Views: A Response to
Essays on According to Our Hearts:
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Multiracial
Family
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*
l.

INTRODUCTION

At the outset, l should note that I am very grateful to all contributors in
this issue-Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, Jennifer
Chacon, Robin Lenhardt, and Laura Rosenbury for their insightful,
powerful, and stirring reactions to my book According to Our Hearts:
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family, 1 and to
Professor Melissa Murray for her elegant Foreword to this issue. Reading
the responses of these scholars whom I admire and respect has been
exhilarating and affirming. Indeed, seeing the many ways in which just a
small group of these reviewers have examined, interpreted, and even "felt"
my scholarship has been invigorating. I also have found the insights from
those reviewers whose visions reached beyond my intended goals for
According to Our Hearts to be a positive signal of the book's ability to
trigger additional debate as well as earn a special place within the literature
* Charles M. and Marion J. Kierscht Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., Grinnell College;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School. angela-onwuachi@uiowa.edu. Thanks to Dean Gail
Agrawal and Charles M. and Marion J. Kierscht for their research support. I am very grateful to both
last year's and this year's editorial board of The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for publishing
this issue on my book According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the
Multicul!ural Family (2013). I am particularly grateful to last year's Managing Editor, Amber
Fricke, and this year's Senior Articles Editor, Kathryne Grendon, and Contributing Editor, Eren
Fleck. Thanks, also, to the many individuals who helped me with According to Our Hearts, but
thanks especially to Nancy Levit, who helped me believe that this book could be a reality. Thanks,
also, to my former Dean Rex Perschbacher, then-Associate Dean Kevin Johnson, and Peg Durkin,
whose support of my quest for the Rhinelander transcript and other related materials made this book
project possible. There are too many others to name here, but the rest of you are all listed in the
acknowledgements of the book. Thanks also to everyone at or with Yale University Press who made
the publication of the book a reality, especially Jaya Chatterjee, Dan Heaton, Bill Frucht, Andrew
Frisardi, and Fred Kameny. Finally, I give special thanks to my husband, Jacob Willig-Onwuachi,
and our children, Elijah, Bethany, and Solomon for their constant love and support. Thanks also to
my family for teaching me much of what I have discussed and analyzed in my book.
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on family, history, society, and love. Ultimately, if According to Our Hearts
causes any of its readers to think more deeply about issues of race, family,
and intimacy-much like it did for the scholars noted above-then the book
will have achieved a significant part of what I hoped for the project.
In this Response Essay, I recount a few of the lessons that I learned
from Professors Abrams, Bridgeman, Chacon, Lenhardt, and Rosenbury, as
well as offer my responses to their critiques, observations, and praise of my
book. In Part II of this Essay, I begin by addressing two contributors'
critiques of the second part of According to Our Hearts by focusing on two
factors that are central to understanding the project as a whole: (1) my
primary goal in writing Part II of According to Our Hearts, and (2) my
intended audience and strategies for reaching that audience. Specifically, in
Part II of this Essay, I focus on Professor Chacon's Opening Our Hearts: A
Response to Angela Onwuachi-Willig 's According to Our Hearts, and
Professor Rosenbury's Marital Status and Privilege. In those essays,
Professors Chacon and Rosenbury both question why I do not challenge
marriage as an institution in According to Our Hearts and also raise
questions about my proposal to add "interraciality" as a covered protected
class in antidiscrimination statutes. Thereafter, in Part III of this Essay, I
move on to discuss the remaining three authors' observations and analyses
regarding various points in According to Our Hearts. In so doing, I highlight
what these readers managed to teach me about my own project and its
potential impact on how we imagine and reimagine ourselves and our
families. In Part III, I primarily address the following essays: Professor
Abrams's The End of Annulment, Professor Bridgeman's On Shifting Hearts
and Minds: Interraciality, Equal Value, and Equality, and Professor
Lenhardt's According to Our Hearts and Location: Toward a Structuralist
Approach to the Study of Interracial Families. Specifically, I highlight
important points that Professor Abrams makes about marriage as the
ultimate form of self-expression, that Professor Bridgeman emphasizes
about the intensity of our sense of fixed racial categories as well as the ways
in which being a part of a multiracial family allows individuals to begin to
challenge those rigid lines, and that Professor Lenhardt underscores about
the need for more scholarship that explores the links between structural
elements and what I refer to as the "placelessness" of multiracial families in
According to Our Hearts.
II.

EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

In their essays about According to Our Hearts, Professors Jennifer
Chacon and Laura Rosenbury inquire whether I have gone far enough in
challenging the normative ideal of family, and they raise a number of
questions and concerns about Part II of the book. In Section A of this Part, I
first address the specific inquiries that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury
make about my decision to focus my book on families formed by intimate
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couples. In Section B, I then address their feedback regarding my proposal at
the end of Part II of According to Our Hearts to add the term "interraciality"
to anti-discrimination statutes.
A. Your View Ain't Like Mine-At Least with Respect to the Focus of
According to Our Hearts 2

In exammmg According to Our Hearts, Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury ask a number of important questions regarding marital status and
privilege. First, Professor Rosenbury wonders why I do not "go beyond ...
legal marriage itself' given its role in perpetuating the normative ideal of
family. 3 She contends that I implicitly reinforce the marital ideal of family
by primarily focusing on "the monoracial aspect of 'same-race couple
privilege. "' 4 Professor Rosenbury explains that legal marriage was
"originally recognized ... in order to provide incentives for white men to
privatize the dependency of white women and their children," and highlights
how that "construct of marriage did not change" when the right of marriage
was extended to Blacks. 5 Speaking again of the many privileges that come
with marital status, she asserts, "[j]ust as one of the privileges of whiteness
is not having to think about race, a privilege of marriage is not having to
think of the ways that society is structured around marriage." 6 Ultimately, on
this point, Professor Rosenbury declares that "even as [I] embrace[] a
nuanced conception of privilege, [I] similarly assume[] that privilege should

2.
This subtitle is a play off of the title of Bebe Moore Campbell's book, YOUR BLUES AIN'T
LIKE MINE ( 1995).
3.
Laura A. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 769, 779
(2013) [hereinafter Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege].
4.

Id. at 780.

5.
Id. at 778-79. Throughout this Essay, I capitalize the words "Black" and "White" when I
use them as nouns to describe a racialized group. I do not capitalize these terms when I use them as
adjectives. Additionally, I find that "[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological
differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern
European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two
typologies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: A/lacking
Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4. Pr9fessor Kimberli: Crenshaw, one of
the founders of Critical Race Theory, has explained that "Black" deserves capitalization because
"Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, ... constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require
denotation as a proper noun." Kimberli: Williams Crenshaw, Race. Reform. and Retrenchment:
Transjormalion and legitimation in Antidiscrimination law, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2
(1988) (emphasis omitted). Also, I generally prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term "African
Americans" because the term "Blacks" is more inclusive. For example, while the term "Blacks"
encompasses black permanent residents or other black non-citizens in the United States, the term
"African Americans" includes only those who are formally United States citizens, either by birth or
naturalization.
6.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 784 (citation omitted).
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flow to marriage; [she contends that I] would simply like more of the
extralegal effects of that privilege to flow to black-white couples." 7
Like Professor Rosenbury, Professor Chacon contends that According
to Our Hearts offers a "triumphalist account of the institution of marriage ..
8
. ."
Although Professor Chacon acknowledges that my proposed legal
solution was not developed "with indifference to the plight of the broad
range of individuals who might suffer from such discrimination," she argues
that my project is largely justified "as a means of protecting individuals in
traditional nuclear family configurations." 9 She worries whether my "focus
on the multiracial family as a site worthy of protection might implicitly buy
into notions of family that are themselves unnecessarily exclusive," and she
points out that "[ s]hoehoming caring relationships into familial categories
that the state easily cognizes can have the effect of marginalizing
relationships that do not conform to the norm." 10 She asserts that there are
no "single parents, [no] adult siblings cohabiting and raising children from
prior relationships, [no] grandparents as primary caregivers, [no]
polyamorous groupings[, and no] single, childless individuals" amongst the
subjects whom I surveyed. 11 Professor Chacon does not question whether
my proposal would offer protection to those who fall outside of the
traditional nuclear family; indeed, she asserts that it would. Instead, she asks
whether the invisibility of non-nuclear families should have mattered to me
more.
All of Professors Chacon's and Rosenbury's points are excellent and
bring up important concerns about the role that marriage plays in
perpetuating unfair status hierarchies that label some families as ideal, others
as closer to that ideal, and still others as deviant. In fact, I have raised very
similar questions about state endorsement of marriage in my previous
scholarship. For example, in my article The Return of the Ring: Welfare
Reform 's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, I challenged
proposals for a marriage cure to poverty in welfare legislation and

7.

Id. at 783.

8.
Jennifer Chacon, Opening Our Hearts: A Response to Angela Onwuachi-Willig 's
According to Our Hearts, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 725, 737-38 (2013) [hereinafter Chacon,
Opening Our Hearts] (asserting that "this account also raises questions about how the privileging of
certain familial structures can play a role in fostering other forms of discrimination").
9.

I 0.

Id. at 735.

Id. at 729, 735.

11.
Id. at 736. Only couples, both opposite-sex and same-sex, were included in my survey and
follow-up interviews. My analysis of cases, however, was slightly broader; ultimately, my case
analyses were limited by the cases that are available to review, and nearly all of the interraciality
cases involved only a plaintiff from a couple. Only one case that I found involved a different family
formation, a single mother and her child, and I analyze that case in Chapter Eight of According to
Our Hearts. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I.
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emphasized the way in which marriage has served as a tool for "privatiz[ing]
responsibility for individual economic stability within the families of newlyemancipated Blacks so that states' economic responsibility to provide for
former slaves would be minimized." 12 Furthermore, in Return of the Ring, I
explicitly expressed my concerns about how states generally endorse
marriage as the only acceptable form of family in contemporary society. 13 I
asserted:
The husband-wife dyad should not be the only household structure
that states encourage and support in the effort to assist poor
families with children to escape poverty. A child does not need
exactly one mother and one father to raise him or her. If it is true
that two parents are better equipped than one, then one must accept
the probability that three are better than two. There is no principled
reason why the law should require the foundation of family where
the care of children is concerned to be an intimate relationship
involving two people of the opposite sex. 14
Generally, I agree with the arguments that Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury have highlighted when those arguments are applied to broad
examinations of family law and marriage; however, both scholars seem to
have ambitions that reach far beyond the more discrete intervention that is
being made in my book. My primary focus in Part II of According to Our
Hearts was never to engage in a broad, overall exploration of family; the
many hierarchies among different family forms; or marriage's role in
perpetuating those hierarchies. Rather, my primary goal was to contest the
perception that law no longer facilitates discrimination against interracial,
heterosexual couples. Although I first began to write my book because of my
attraction to the Rhinelander case itself (which is the focus of Part I of
According to Our Hearts), I was moved to write Part II because I
specifically wanted to focus on the narrow goal of contesting the toofrequently-held and -asserted assumption that Loving v. Virginia and its
progeny eliminated all negative, legal effects of racism for interracial,
heterosexual couples.
Indeed, throughout Part II of According to Our Hearts, I explicitly
frame, identify, and remind readers of my limited goal of discrediting the
myth of a discrimination-free life, as it relates to law, for interracial,
heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v. Virginia era. For instance, in
Chapter Six of According to Our Hearts, I explicitly state that my aim is to

12.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Re.form's Marriage Cure as
the Revival a/Post-Bel/um Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653 (2005).
13.

Id. at 1688-94.

14.

Id. at 1689.
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disprove the idea that our legal system adequately protects interracial,
heterosexual couples and to expose how law facilitates unique forms of
discrimination and microaggressions 15 against such couples and their
families. I assert:
Because antidiscrimination law generally excludes gay and lesbian
individuals from protection from discrimination based on sexual
orientation and because there is prevalent, open prejudice against
same-sex couples in our society, the lack of legal protection and
social acceptance for gay and lesbian couples and their families is
widely exposed for all to see. However, it is not so easily exposed
for interracial, heterosexual couples; my goal in this book is to
make such lack of acceptance and protection under the law for
multiracial families more visible for others to see and understand.
In this second part of According to Our Hearts, I unpack the widely
held assumptions about how law adequately protects interracial,
heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v. Virginia era, showing,
instead, how law and society function together to create both a
legal and social placelessness for multiracial families and the
individuals within them. 16
Similarly, at the beginning of Chapter Seven of According to Our Hearts, I
reiterate the focus of my argument in Part II of the book. I indicate:
[B]ecause in this chapter, like the rest of this book, I wish to
challenge the commonly accepted notion that legal discouragement
of and punishment for intimate, cross-racial heterosexual intimacy
no longer exists, I focus largely on individuals in interracial,
heterosexual couples, and specifically black-white couples, as a
means of unpacking and discrediting these legal myths. 17
Naturally, I found that the most convincing way to discredit this myth
about interracial, heterosexual couples was to focus my analyses on the very
couples who are the subject of the myth. Indeed, when I started to write
According to Our Hearts, I initially intended to include only interracial,
heterosexual couples in my survey and interviews because, as I note several
times in the book, 18 no one can deny that anti-discrimination laws do not

15.
DERALD WING SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 5 (2010) (defining microaggressions as "brief and commonplace, daily
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious slights
and insults to the target person or group").
16.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 121-22 (emphasis added).

17.

Id. at 20 I (emphasis added).

18.

See, e.g., id. at 121-22, 200-01.
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adequately protect families consisting of and headed by same-sex couples,
whether they are monoracial or interracial. It was not until later that I
changed my mind and decided to also include interracial, same-sex
couples. 19 Admittedly, this decision to include interracial, same-sex couples
in my survey was influenced, in part, by my emotions-by my sense that it
just did not feel right to exclude interracial, same-sex couples, couples with
whom I, as a friend, had often discussed these issues and whom I knew had
undergone comparable experiences. In this sense, I agree with Professor
Chacon; my emotional reaction to the thought of excluding interracial, samesex couples is, in a way, a recognition that "[s]hoehoming caring
relationships into familial categories that the state easily cognizes can have
the effect of' writing out certain kinds of relationships. 20 However, my
decision to include interracial, same-sex couples in my survey and
interviews was not based solely on emotion, but also by my sense that the
same arguments that I was making about the realities for interracial,
heterosexual couples would, at some point, also apply (though not exactly in
the same way) to same-sex couples. As I was writing According to Our
Hearts, it became clear that the right to gay marriage was changing from one
of pure exclusion to greater inclusion 21 (not a high standard, given the extent
of exclusion across the country). Against this backdrop, I reasoned that it
was even more crucial for me to include interracial, same-sex couples in my
survey and interviews because I could imagine a future in which the United
States Supreme Court would strike down bans on same-sex marriage as
unconstitutional and more so, could imagine a future in which people would
make similar Loving-fixed-everything-in-the-law-type arguments after such
a decision, despite what I knew would be a future contrasting reality of
continued discrimination and microaggressions for families consisting of or
centered around same-sex couples.
Again, the goal of my project, and specifically Part II (where Professors

19.
In fact, as I was writing According to Our Hearts, I had many casual conversations with
people that confirmed this point. When people would ask me about my book, I would briefly
describe the project to them. They were always encouraging, but they always focused in on the fact
that I was interviewing same-sex couples and tended to zero in on the right to gay marriage. It was
clear to me that most people saw the issue of multiracial families as a non-issue in law. To them,
there was no problem, either legally or socially, for families consisting of or headed by interracial,
heterosexual couples because of cases like loving v. Virginia. Of course, this reaction only made it
clearer to me that I needed to deconstruct the myth of adequate legal protections for heterosexual,
interracial couples.
20.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 735.

21.
Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage for the First Time, CNN.COM (Nov.
7, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/l l/07/politics/pol-same-sex-marriage (noting that
"Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire and New York - - and the District of
Columbia" allow gay marriage and further stating that "[r]ecent national surveys have shown
shifting attitudes toward same-sex marriage, with a majority of Americans now approving of
marriages between two men or two women").
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Chacon and Rosenbury focus their criticisms), was not to challenge the
hierarchies among different family forms, or to challenge the institution of
marriage itself. There is already a very rich and extensive legal literature on
these very topics, including scholarship by Professor Rosenbury 22 and other
scholars such as Professors Martha Fineman, 23 Katherine Franke, 24 Melissa
Murray, 25 Nancy Polikoff, 26 and Alice Ristroph. 27 However, before I wrote
According to Our Hearts, there was essentially no literature in law that
focused on the arguments that I was making about the gaps in legal
protections afforded to interracial, heterosexual couples in a post-Loving v.

22.
See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59
EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010) ("arguing that sex should be decoupled in the legal sphere from both
domestic relationships and other traditional forms of emotional intimacy" and challenging "the
dominant, almost sacred, understanding that the most important relationships between adults should
always be both sexual and emotionally intimate"); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?] (explaining "how
family law's failure to recognize friendship impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality
through the elimination of state-supported gender role expectations" and contending that "family
law's recognition of marriage and silence with respect to friendship maintains a divide between
marriage and 'mere' friendship, implying that nonspousal friendship differs sufficiently from
marriage and marriage-like relationships to be properly outside the concern of family law").

See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 239,
23.
244-45 (2001) (citations omitted) ("The concept of marriage, and the assumptions it carries with it,
limit development of family policy and distort our ideology. The availability of marriage precludes
consideration of other solutions to social problems. As the various (and by no means exhaustive)
meanings of marriage listed above indicate, marriage is expected to do a lot of work in our society.
Children must be cared for and nurtured, dependency must be addressed, and individual happiness is
of general concern. The first question we should be asking is whether the existence of a marriage is,
in and of itself, essential to accomplishing any of the societal goals or objectives we assign to it.").
24.
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 104, 1399, 1414 (2004) (challenging the push for the right to gay marriage because
such legal reforms have "created a path dependency that privileges privatized and domesticated
rights and legal liabilities, while rendering less viable projects that advance nonnorrnative notions of
kinship, intimacy, and sexuality").

See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
25.
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 439-40 (2008) ("[T]he reform project that has been
underway in family law has been the effort to reconcile heterosexual marriage as the normative
model for adult intimate relationships with the reality of a diversity of adult intimate relationships.
Reforms in this area have cleaved to three basic approaches."); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray,
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1240 (2010) ("Legislators and other policymakers
are free to regulate families qua families, and to encourage or discourage certain kinds of familial
relationships. Legal privileges or burdens are often contingent on an individual's family status. One
of the most obvious ways in which states-and the federal government-have established a
particular vision of the family is by limiting civil marriage to heterosexual couples.").
See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
26.
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA.
L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) (highlighting that privileging marriage over other types of intimate
relationships can reinforce gendered roles and assumptions that are associated with marriage).
27.

See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 25, at 1240.
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Virginia era. 28 To my mind, it made no sense for me to spend time

replicating part of the excellent work that other scholars had already
produced and were continuing to conduct on issues of marriage and the
hierarchies among different family relations when I could offer completely
new insights on a topic that I viewed as vastly underexplored. 29
In fact, no part of Professor Chacon and Rosenbury's critiques
illustrates the distinction between my project and their proposed project
more than two particular segments of Professor Rosenbury's essay Marital
Status and Privilege. In the first segment, Professor Rosenbury asserts the
following:
Unpacking the knapsack of unearned marital privilege, and
spreading its goods across a broader range of relationships,
therefore appears to be the best strategy for loosening, if not
releasing, the ideal of family. In a world that recognized more
diverse forms of relationship, place-based racial hierarchies and
other forms of white privilege would still disadvantage black
couples and black-white couples. But legal marriage would no
longer clearly privilege some and stigmatize others, cracking the
foundation of extralegal forces that maintain hierarchies of
· h"1p. 30
re 1at10ns
Through this quoted language, Professor Rosenbury sets forth arguments
that detail why I should have challenged marriage as "the norm against
which all relationships are measured." 31 At the same time, however,
Professor Rosenbury seems to give in to the idea that race-based hierarchies
cannot be dismantled. In this sense, she surrenders my specific project,
which is about race and disrupting, challenging, and eliminating a particular
kind of racial hierarchy among families, in favor of what she views as the
larger or more crucial project of breaking up the mold of "extralegal forces
that maintain hierarchies of relationship," even though, as she notes, "black
couples and black-white couples" will still be disadvantaged. 32 Yet, if one
28.
I had previously co-authored such work with my husband. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig
& Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (2009).
29.
Moreover, given the limited number of pages that I had for writing According to Our
Hearts, it became clear early on that I could not also convey broad-based arguments about marriage
and family in the book. In fact, in the middle of my book drafting, I had to accept that I would have
to delay my plans for including a close examination of children in multiracial families in According
to Our Hearts and reserve it for another book project. For similar reasons, I, in part, made the
decision at the outset of the book project to look only at black-white couples and their families.
30.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 785-86 (citation omitted).

31.

Id. at 785.

32.
Id. at 786. My comment here is not intended at all to question Professor Rosenbury's
commitment to an antiracist stance, as I know that her commitment is strong.
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concedes defeat by accepting the permanence of racial and interracial
hierarchy among "couples" and family units and takes that issue out of
According to Our Hearts, one has effectively cut out the core of my project.
After all, According to Our Hearts covers the "law of the multiracial
family," and its whole point is to challenge racial hierarchies among
families, and specifically those that place multiracial families on the margins
or leave them suspended in placelessness. 33
In a second segment, Professor Rosenbury illustrates, again, an
important distinction between the project that she and Professor Chacon
suggest and my project in According to Our Hearts. In her essay, Professor
Rosenbury makes the following point:
Onwuachi-Willig targets privilege that monoracial couples no
doubt enjoy and black-white couples often do not. Yet in
describing that privilege, she posits a world in which couples are
first, either "intimate partners" or "just friends," and, later, are
either "intimate partners," "just friends," or "strangers." In doing
so, Onwuachi-Willig embraces a hierarchy of relationships:
privilege attaches to the understanding that couples are "intimate
partners," and harm or discrimination flows from the mistaken
perception that they are "just friends." In fact, "just friends" may
be just like "strangers," given the modification of OnwuachiWillig's description.
Onwuachi-Willig therefore implicitly embraces states'
privileging of legal marriage over other relationships between
adults, including friendship. After all, states recognize marriage
and only marriage-friends are generally grouped with strangers
for purposes of family law. More explicitly, like the majority

33.
Id. at 785-86. This segment of Professor Rosenbury's paper also highlights the stark
differences between the way that she and I view this issue of hierarchy. For example, Professor
Rosenbury attributes the fact that I "lament[] that 'true intimacy' or 'true relationships' between
African Americans and whites often did not result in marriage in the pre-Civil Rights era," to a
personal view of "marriage as an effective relationship." Id. at 777 n.52. However, while I do value
marriage as an institution more than most progressive family law scholars, my bemoaning of these
particular couples' inability to marry was not a statement about marriage or its effectiveness as a
relationship, but instead one about exclusion based on race. I, like many sociologists and like legal
scholars such as Professor Randall Kennedy, believe that interracial marriage rates-and,
historically, the racial groups that were covered by anti-miscegenation laws-provide us with crucial
information about the status of different racial groups and thus different racial make-ups of families
within our society. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, law, and
Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 818-20 (1997) (stating that "African Americans are
substantially less likely to marry whites than are Hispanics, Asians, or native Americans[,]" that the
fact "[t]hat blacks intermarry with whites at strikingly lower rates than others is yet another sign of
the uniquely encumbered and peculiarly isolated status of African Americans[,]" and that such facts
are "an impediment to the development of attitudes and connections that will be necessary to
improve the position of black Americans and, beyond that, to address the racial divisions that
continue to hobble our nation").
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opm10n in Lawrence v. Texas, Onwuachi-Willig promotes "one
vision of intimacy-that of a couple engaged in emotional and
sexual intimacy." She therefore reinforces the common distinction
between individuals who are viewed as dating and those who are
"just friends," a "distinction [that] implies that [the] dating
relationship may lead to the privileged state of marriage, whereas
34
the friendship will not."
As Professor Rosenbury correctly notes, I do make a distinction in my book
between family relationships and friendships. In fact, in the endnotes of
According to Our Hearts, I define the phrase "because of interraciality" as
follows:
My use of the phrase 'because ofinterraciality' concerns more than
just mistreatment based on one's involvement in an intimate,
interracial relationship-marriage or a committed, non-marital
relationship. Generally speaking, the phrase encompasses
mistreatment based on one's being part of an interracial family
unit, which includes sibling relationships and parent-child
relationships. It does not extend to mistreatment based on platonic
friendships, however. 35
While Professor Rosenbury has written compelling articles about the way in
which marital and other intimate relationships may be unjustly privileged
over friendships, such as in state intestacy rules, 36 that argument, at least to
my mind, does not directly touch upon the specific arguments that I am
setting forth in According to Our Hearts about the law's continued role,
along with social norms, in facilitating discrimination against those in
multiracial families. Indeed, being part of a collective that is generally
recognized as part of a family unit is central to many of the examples that I
highlight in my book, such as my analysis of gaps in employment
discrimination law that do not allow for the recognition of the harms of an
"invisible" couple requirement for certain jobs in Chapter Seven of
According to Our Hearts. 37
Furthermore, Professor Rosenbury's point about the hierarchy of
relationships that places friends and strangers at the bottom of the ladder

34.

Rosenbury. Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 783-84 (citations omitted).

35.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG,

supra note I, at 284 n.54, 300 n.4, 305 n. I.

36.
Rosenbury, Friends with Benl?/itsr, supra note 22, at 216-19. In fact, in this segment,
Professor Rosenbury highlights a point on which she and I may very well disagree. Like many
family law scholars, I do not necessarily believe that benefits should be accorded on the basis of
relationship, but if relationships remain the basis for distributing benefits, then I am not convinced,
though one day I may be, that friendships should be at the same level as marital relationships, sibling
relationships, and parent-child relationships, for example.
37.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG,

supra note I, at 212-32.
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runs contrary to a specific point that I make about the place of friends versus
family members within the relationship hierarchies in antidiscrimination law
doctrine. As I note in Chapter Eight of According to Our Hearts, in such
contexts, interracial relationships among friends are generally privileged
over interracial relationships among family members, and particularly over
those between interracial partners, which I contend are implicitly
discouraged by the law. Here, I argue, the law works to encourage interracial
friendships or working relationships, and it even provides a remedy for the
loss of such connections, but it fails to do the same in certain contexts that
involve interracial spouses and partners. As I explain in Chapter Eight,
courts, due to law and society's limited and rigid understanding of racial
categories, fail to acknowledge how the racial identity of individuals in
multiracial family units may actually change based on their family
experiences (such as when a white woman who is married to a black man,
much like Professor Heather Dalmage, begins to view herself as a "nonwhite, white person"). 38 Thus, courts neglect to see these individuals as
having standing to pursue certain harassment claims. Specifically, I explain:
In particular, current antidiscrimination law does not allow for a
claim alleging direct, discriminatory harm to a plaintiff where the
racial group targeted by the offensive and discriminatory
comments is not the racial group to which the plaintiff-employee
belongs, but rather the racial group to which the employee's spouse
or partner belongs. In these cases, courts' understanding of how
people-in particular, whites in interracial relationships-define
themselves racially is too narrow. Under Title VII, a "plaintiff may
assert only his own right to be free from discrimination that has an
effect upon him and may not assert the rights of others to be free
from discrimination." Courts have read this legal rule very
narrowly, and as a result, plaintiffs who allege direct harm based
upon being subjected to and negatively affected by comments
regarding the racial group to which their spouse belongs are held to
have no standing to sue. Only members of the racial group to
which the comments and actions are targeted, whether or not they
individually are the direct target of the conduct, can bring a viable
claim on this basis. In others words, under current case analysis, a
black plaintiff has standing to pursue a lawsuit for harm suffered as
a result of witnessing and hearing derogatory racial comments
against blacks other than herself. Such conduct is viewed, and
rightfully so, as having the ability to directly affect and harm that
plaintiffs environment even where she is not identified as the
target. But a plaintiff who is not part of the racial group, even if she

38.

Id. at 256-64.
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is married to a person of that racial group, is seen as asserting harm
only to a third party. In other words, unless the plaintiff describes
her harm from the harassment as her being deprived of a diverse
work environment-meaning racial minority co-workers in the
workplace-because of the harassment, she has no claim. This limited framing for a claim, however, anticipates only temporary
connections and effects from cross-racial, work interactions,
rather than the long-term or lifelong connections and impacts that
occur within families. In other words, the invisible assumptions
about whom we may be connected to or should be connected to in
friendships as opposed to familial or intimate relationships works
to further reinforce the normative ideal of family as monoracial. 39
In other words, for various arguments that I make in According to Our
Hearts, the distinctions between friendships and intimate interracial
relationships matters, and they matter specifically because of the different
ways in which interracial friendships get privileged over intimate, interracial
relationships in certain antidiscrimination law contexts. In these contexts,
unlike the situations that Professor Rosenbury focuses on in her scholarship
such as intestacy matters, it is not the marital relationship that gets privileged
over the friendship, but rather, it is the opposite.
Finally, while Professor Rosenbury's contention that I "would simply
like more of the extralegal effects of that privilege to flow to black-white
couples" 40 is correct, I do not see such desire as a problem in this instance.
To my mind, there is nothing wrong with making an argument for equality
for a particular group. My desire for black-white couples to enjoy more of
the benefits that monoracial white couples enjoy does not mean that I do not
want all families to enjoy these same benefits. Indeed, I may write an article
that contends that black women should enjoy the same rights and privileges
that white women enjoy in one area (as I have done in the past), 41 but my
decision to make an argument about black women does not mean that I do
not want Asian-American women or Latinas to enjoy those same rights and
privileges. Rather, it just means that I made a decision to focus my
arguments on black women (with the recognition that different groups get
racialized and gendered in distinct ways). 42 The same reasoning applies to

39.

Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

40.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 783.

41.
See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of'
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. I 079 (2010) [hereinatler Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair
Piece] (criticizing courts for misapplying their own standards for evaluating "hair discrimination" to
hair grooming policies that prohibit natural hairstyles for black women, such as braids, locks, and
twists).
42.

See
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According to Our Hearts; I made a decision to focus on discrediting a
particular myth, one that had not yet been explored and that I believed to be
an important one that deserved special attention. The mere fact that I chose
to focus on advocating for the increased rights or acceptance of one group
does not mean I have abandoned my commitment to others.
Further, I believe that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury's questions
regarding the institution of marriage pay little heed to the audience factor.
After all, one's audience always influences how she frames and states her
arguments. With According to Our Hearts, I, like many first-time book
authors, wrote the book with starry-eyed dreams of publishing a manuscript
that would be accessible to many people, and in particular, accessible to
significant numbers of non-lawyers. In fact, I worked hard to create a book
that I believed could appeal to the everyday person outside of academia. To
my mind, if I used According to Our Hearts to challenge the very institution
of marriage, an institution, which as Professor Rosenbury indicates, "[ f]ew
[would] question whether states should privilege ... at all," 43 I would tum
most readers away from my primary argument of discrediting a harmful
myth about the lives of interracial, heterosexual couples. They would not
even begin to consider my primary argument because they would be so
focused on, and most likely angered by, the rejection of marriage as an
institution. 44
Although According to Our Hearts does not address the broader
concerns that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury raise, I believe that the
book succeeds in meeting the goals I set for it (and Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury seem to agree). For instance, Professor Rosenbury specifies that
According to Our Hearts

illustrates the ways law perpetuates housing segregation,
discouraging the formation of interracial relationships and often
limiting the areas in which interracial spouses feel comfortable
living. [Professor Rosenbury further explains that i]n even more
detail, ... [the book] analyzes how some courts have adopted
narrow interpretations of employment discrimination laws, failing
to provide redress for employees facing harassment or adverse
employment actions because of their interracial relationships. Such

INTRODUCTION 9 (2012).
43.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 782.

44.
In fact, many of the law professors who stand as the harshest critics of marriage as an
institution are in fact married themselves. I certainly understand the many practical reasons why
even these critics may still choose to get married, but if the revolution against marriage as an
institution does not begin with these critics, despite their strong views, it hardly seems wise, even if I
were willing to make broader arguments than the ones necessary for my primary aim in According to
Our Hearts, to make such challenges to marriage to a lay audience that is certain to hold marriage in
high esteem.
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interpretations render invisible the ways employers may privilege
employees in monoracial marriages to the detriment of employees
in interracial marriages. 45
Professor Chacon adds to this claim, asserting I "establish[] that individuals
in interracial marriages, or with children of racial backgrounds distinct from
their own, are still subjected to everyday microaggressions and more
egregious acts of discrimination." 46
In sum, while the project that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury hoped
that I would pursue in According to Our Hearts is meaningful and definitely
worth exploration, and is, in fact the topic of articles and essays by other
scholars, including the excellent work of Professor Rosenbury, 47 it is not my
project. According to Our Hearts contains a narrower focus, one that has not
been pursued and is currently not being pursued by any other legal scholars,
and one that speaks to a broad, rather than a purely academic, audience. In
the end, I am grateful to Professors Chacon and Rosenbury for raising these
inquiries so adeptly and compellingly, such that the three of us could have
this conversation in this colloquium and, more so, so that any person who
reads According to Our Hearts, along with these essays, may also begin to
have similar conversations.
B. Your Views Are Like Mine; However, I Am Not That Hopeful

In addition to wanting me to challenge the institution of marriage in
According to Our Hearts, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury also question
my proposal to incorporate a new category called "interraciality" into antidiscrimination statutes. Nevertheless, both Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury pinpoint two items in my analyses of workplace discrimination
based on interraciality as significant. For instance, Professor Rosenbury
asserts that my consideration of ways that "monoracial marital privilege
extends beyond the social sphere to the workplace. . . . is an important
contribution, as scholars often assume that work is immune from the
dynamics of intimacy pervading the private sphere." 48 Additionally,
Professor Chacon notes that "the most hopeful parts of[my] book [are] those
in which [I] document[] the ways in which being part of an interracial
collective actually transformed how certain members of the unit understood
their own racial identities." 49

45.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (citations omitted).

46.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 735 (citation omitted).

4 7.

See supra note 22.

48.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 786 (citations omitted).

49.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 738.

808

The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice

[16:2013]

However, both Professors Chacon and Rosenbury express concerns
about my proposal to add "interraciality" as a covered category in antidiscrimination statutes. Professor Rosenbury contends that such an addition
would keep "those living outside the married couple form ... stigmatized"
and "would likely reinforce monoracial privilege" because it would exclude
interraciality from the definition of "race" and thus reinforce the sense that
monoraciality, and not interraciality, is normative. 50 Professor Rosenbury
further contends that the proposed category of "interraciality" would limit
understandings of the performative nature of race, "further solidifying rather
than destabilizing notions of race." 51 In the end, Professor Rosenbury argues
that I should further embrace "the relational nature of race, racial privilege,
and racial discrimination" and "support[] a more robust conception of the
existing category of 'race,"' as "[t]he analysis in According to Our Hearts
provides the most compelling account to date of the ways in which the
choice of one's intimate partner influences understandings of race in the
workplace, as well as throughout society, and the benefits and harms that
flow therefrom." 52
Like Professor Rosenbury, Professor Chacon questions my proposal for
an additional category of "interraciality." She offers three reasons to explain
why an "interraciality" category would not be advisable: (1) "the addition of
this category could be seen as a reason to abandon efforts to expand the legal
understanding of what constitutes discrimination based on race"; (2) courts
will likely read interraciality too narrowly; and (3) it would require
"Congress to reopen discussion of the antidiscrimination provisions if they
want to add a category" and "[g]iven political retrenchment on equality
issues in recent years, it seems just as likely that the result would be a
congressional narrowing of antidiscrimination law once the topic was
opened for discussion." 53
In making these arguments, Professor Chacon notes her recognition of
my internal struggle in offering a proposal for an additional category of
"interraciality." 54 After acknowledging my various articles that examine race
as a factor that is determined by both physical and performative factors 55

50.

Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 787-88.

51.

Id. at 788.

52.

Id. at 788-90.

53.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 730-31, 734.

Id. at 732 ("A robust understanding of racial discrimination in antidiscrimination law
54.
would protect these aspects of personhood, but a crabbed understanding of discrimination does not
do so. Professor Onwuachi-Willig knows this. which is probably why she does not have much faith
that couns will apply an expansive version of antidiscrimination protections . . . . " (emphasis
added)).

55.

See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
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and that "criticize[] the failure of antidiscrimination laws to offer protection
for individuals who fail to perform their identities in ways that conform to
majoritarian preferences," 56 Professor Chacon warns that my "additive
approach-designed to deal with the realities of the jurisprudence--could
have the undesirable effect of reifying the logic that undergirds a narrower
understanding of what constitutes discrimination on the basis of race. " 57 She
asks: "[S]hould we add new categories, or work on reimagining the existing
categories?" 58 She concludes that we should not add a box for an interracial
category because doing so just runs "the risk of hardening the lines against
those whose claims do not fit neatly in any ofthem." 59
I agree with all of the substantive arguments that Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury make about my proposal for an additional category of
"interraciality" in antidiscrimination statutes. In fact, as Professor Chacon
notes in her essay, "no one writes about or understands these limits better
than" I do. 60 Indeed, in According to Our Hearts, I make it clear that I
believe that "interraciality" easily fits within the category of "race." 61
Specifically, I write: "Although one could argue (to my mind, convincingly
and easily) that the phrase because of such individual's race already
Regarded as Black and Why Title Vil Should Apply Even i{Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 1283, 1295-1334 (contending that courts understand race too narrowly, focusing on skin
color as a proxy for race, and ignoring other factors and proxies used to identify race such as name
or voice); Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece, supra note 41, 1093-1124 (making a strategic,
biological, and intersectional argument to explain why dress codes that prohibit natural hairstyles for
black women, such as braids, locks, and twists, discriminate on the basis of race and sex, but noting
how hairstyles are viewed as signaling something about black women's racial palatability); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1907-1914 (2007). See
also D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What's Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To Do
with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1360-94 (2008) (arguing for greater judicial appreciation of the
ways that appearance-related regulations are part of how race gets defined and how they operate as a
form of racial discrimination); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:
Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1172-94 (2004)
(analyzing how employers use appearance and grooming standards to identify which racial identity
performances are acceptable in the workplace and arguing that such efforts constitute intentional
discrimination under Title VII); Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy:
The Case olProposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227,
1247-75 (2000) (analyzing the use of language and immigration status as proxies for identifying and
then discriminating against Latinos); c{ Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49
DUKE L.J. 1487, 1551-55 (2000) (noting that existing antidiscrimination laws fail to protect from
discrimination on the basis of skin color or skin tone, e.g., a light-skinned Black versus a darkskinned Black).
56.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 731.

57.

Id. at 732.

58.

Id. at 733.

59.

Id. at 734.

Id. Of course, I can identify a number of scholars who write and understand these issues
60.
better than I do, but I am running with the language here.
61.

0NWUACH!-WILLIG, supra note I, at 264.
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encompasses a broad range of harms, including those based on interraciality,
there are many practical and policy reasons for adding interraciality to the
text of antidiscrimination statutes." 62 In essence, I agree with Professors
Chacon and Rosenbury that race is not just defined by the physical, but also
by performance; that courts have defined race too narrowly in case law; and
that the category of race already subsumes interraciality. In fact, Professor
Chacon correctly interprets the basis for my decision to propose an
additional "interraciality" category when she expresses her belief that I made
my proposal because I do not "have much faith that courts will apply an
expansive version of antidiscrimination protections" that include "(a] robust
understanding of [race and] racial discrimination .... " 63
What Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I disagree about is not
substance, but rather strategy. For me, the question is not merely whether
interraciality fits within the already existing category of race. The question is
what plan or strategy is best for either taking us or getting us closer to the
point where courts and citizens understand this very idea. In essence, while
writing According to Our Hearts, I asked myself, "In a situation where I am
wary about whether the war can ever be won, am I willing to embrace and
accept the mere act of winning a battle?" In making my proposal at the end
of According to Our Hearts, I answered "yes"-though I did not arrive at
that answer without hesitation. Although I, like Professor Chacon, am weary
about many people's narrow understandings of the concept of (and reality
of) race, 64 I am not certain that the best strategy is to hold out, in an all-ornothing fashion, for these same people to gain a true understanding of race
and racism. Sadly, as someone who teaches and speaks about race and race
discrimination, often to those who are trying very hard to understand race
discrimination and the ways in which race is socially constructed, I must
admit that I am not too hopeful about our reaching a point when the
overwhelming majority of citizens, particularly Whites, will truly understand
all of the complexities of race and racism. As Peggy Mcintosh explained in
her article White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, it is
particularly hard for Whites to understand race and the complex nature of
racism because Whites are generally "oblivious" to all of the many
privileges, both small and large, that come with their racial status. 65 Whites,

62.

Id.

63.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 732.

64.
Id. at 730 ("Past experience suggests that this hope is not necessarily misplaced."); see
also id. at 733-34 ("The pragmatist would see that litigants challenging discrimination have not
always had much luck convincing courts to apply antidiscrimination statutes expansively. The
pragmatist might therefore seek to add a new category to address a specific social harm that is not
always covered by antidiscrimination laws. That is the approach that Professor Onwuachi-Willig
takes, and she can hardly be faulted for that .... ").
65.

PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE: UNPACKING THE INVISIBLE KNAPSACK (1989),
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she says, "are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, and
average, and also ideal, so that when we work to benefit others, this is seen
as work which will allow 'them' to be more like 'us.'" 66 In this sense, race
for Whites becomes something that other people have. Additionally,
children of all races are taught in schools and elsewhere that race is
tantamount to the physical-usually skin color-and that racism and race
discrimination consist of consciously not liking someone or consciously
mistreating someone because of their skin color. 67 In fact, research by
Professor Ann Morning of New York University's Sociology Department
illustrates that Whites still describe race in merely physical terms and
generally ignore the performative aspect of race. 68 Drawing on in-depth
interviews with more than fifty white American (meaning United States
citizen) college students, Professor Morning reveals that Whites frequently
define race as based in biology and genes, often conflate race with ethnicity,
and describe race as "skin color plus culture. " 69 Of the seventeen percent of
students-mostly anthropology students from one Ivy League school-who
defined race as a social construction, when they were asked more in-depth
questions, they too reverted to physical explanations about genes and
biology. 70 In essence, even when people have formally learned about race as
a social construct, they often do not fully internalize that understanding, and
instead rely on more commonly-held and simplistic definitions of race as a
biological reality.
Like Professors Chacon and Rosenbury, I would prefer if courts and
everyday citizens had more complicated understandings of race, but I am
doubtful that such an achievement will occur without an intermediate step.
In According to Our Hearts, I propose adding the category of"interraciality"
because I view it as this much-needed intermediate step. Professor
Rosenbury is correct in her belief that one reason why people may be able to
grasp "interraciality" is because it, ironically, reinforces the idea of
monoraciality as normative and interraciality as non-normative, which I

available at http://www.nymbp.org/reference/WhitePrivilege.pdf.
66.

Id.

67.
Id.; see also Ann Morning, Toward a Sociology ()(Racial Conceptualization for the 2J-"
Century, 87 Soc. FORCES 1167, 1168 (2009) (noting that "[b]iological or 'essentialist'
understandings of race in particular are routinely linked to prejudice").

68.
See Morning, supra note 67, at 1169 (highlighting that even though "the academic idea of
race as socially constructed has circulated widely enough to have gained a popular, if unfaithful,
translation as 'race is not real' ... the claim that races are genetically distinct groups is not only
enjoying a scientific renaissance, but is also being conveyed through new products and services such
as genetic genealogy tests that claim to identify individuals' racial ancestry, race-targeted
pharmaceuticals, and even vitamins") (citations omitted).
69.

Id. at 1173-78.

70.

Id. at 1178, 1183-84.
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agree is bad. However, this result may not be all bad, because the very act of
adding a category, such as interraciality, forces people to think more broadly
about questions of race and its categorization, which in tum may lead them
to a better and more complex understanding of race.
In fact, I have witnessed such processes in action during my
presentations of draft portions of According to Our Hearts at faculty
workshops, conferences, and lectures. At those presentations where I
advanced my proposal regarding the addition of an "interraciality" category,
one person would usually ask: "Well, what about those cases that do not
quite fit into interraciality? What about those cases involving religion or
color and so on? Wouldn't it make sense to also add an interreligion- or
intercolor-type category?" After first making it clear that I fully believe that
the interraciality cases I discuss in my book are "race" cases-that is, if race
and the frameworks that incorporate "race" are understood properly-I then
answer, "Yes, it makes perfect sense." After this response, that same person
usually follows up with: "So, where do we draw the line? When do we stop
adding categories?" And, that question is often precisely the right question
to pose. In fact, I believe that this question is often what pushes people
closer towards a deeper understanding of race. In many instances, it is this
question about where the categories should stop that enables people to at
least begin to conceive of race and other identity categories with more
complexity. Once an audience member questions whether the boundaries of
race are purely physical, she then begins to understand race as both a
structure and a process, and also begins to see how interraciality already fits
within the traditional, statutory identity category of race. From there, the
audience member usually moves even further forward and also starts to
break the mold around and evolve her own understandings of identity. And,
as Professor Chacon predicts in her essay, such responses are exactly my
hope: "that an expansion of antidiscrimination law will prompt the further
evolution of social norms." 71
At the end of the day, with respect to my proposal for an additional
"interraciality" category, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I find
ourselves in a situation where we disagree about paths to take, rather than
about what is substantively preferable. For me, the likelihood that the

71.
Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 730. Professor Chacon makes a compelling
argument about the evolution of social norms that she desires in her piece loving Across Borders:
Immigration low and the limits of Loving. Jennifer M. Chacon, loving Across Borders:
Immigration law and the limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 378 ('These legal changes have
created a large, undocumented underclass with limited prospects for obtaining the benefits of
citizenship, including protection of their intimate relationships."). In so doing, she does a beautiful
job of connecting hierarchies related to bias in the field of immigration with racial hierarchies. Id. at
376 ('The nativism that concerned the Supreme Court in loving has long contributed to the shape of
U.S. immigration policy. It is therefore important to understand the ways that immigration laws also
regulate family formation in ways that perpetuate racial hierarchy.").
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general public, legislators, lawyers, and judges will adopt or accept my
proposed changes has factored more prominently in my recent scholarship. 72
Much like Professor Chacon's purported curmudgeonly reaction to the
Rhinelanders' "love" story, 73 I am pessimistic about the type of change that
is actually likely to occur within our political and legal system-a system
that is generally resistant to change, and even when open to change, tends to
be open only to incremental change. 74 At the end of According to Our
Hearts, I indulge my pessimism with my ultimate proposal of adding the
category of"interraciality."
In the end, Professors Chacon and Rosenbury and I desire to get to the
same end place; 75 I am just more willing to allow for an intermediate step on
the way to that goal. In fact, it is fair to say that I worry that waiting for
people to actually gain a full understanding of race and racism may mean
that we never reach our end goal at all. On the other hand, Professors
Chacon and Rosenbury worry that if we put tiny steps like my addition of
"interraciality" in the middle of the path, we just might get stuck on those
steps-a view that also makes complete sense given the history of
antidiscrimination law.
That said, to some extent, reading some of the language that Professors
Chacon and Rosenbury use in their own essay responses (and that I used or

72.
See, e.g., Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece, supra note 41, at 104 (making a
strategic, litigation-based argument that rested on biology and was not in line with the framework I
viewed as best for understanding such claims, because it adopted the rationale used by various courts
and exposed how they were misapplying their own reasoning). In Another Hair Piece, I assert:
[M]y claim here is not that race is purely biological or that biological arguments are
the only way-or even the best way-to grant black women protection from
discriminatory grooming codes under Title VII. Instead, my argument here is much
narrower and decidedly strategic. My claim is that, but for the courts' incorrect
assumptions about black women's hair, black women would already be protected from
employers' prohibitions of braided, locked, and twisted hairstyles, just as black men
(as well as black women) are protected from certain employer restrictions on Afro
hairstyles.
Id.

73.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 726.

74.

I suspect that Professors Chacon and Rosenbury share my pessimism in this regard.

75.
I acknowledge that Professor Rosenbury's definition of race may not expand as widely as
my own. In her essay, she asserts that I analyze "how some courts have adopted narrow
interpretations of employment discrimination laws, failing to provide redress for employees facing
harassment or adverse employment actions because of their interracial relationships." Rosenbury,
Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (emphasis added). However, in my harassment
example, I explicitly contest "race" as being too narrow, making the case for why what I call a "nonwhite, white" person like Heather Dalmage should have standing to bring a harassment claim based
on comments and actions taken against Blacks, not Whites. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at
256--64. Contrary to Professor Rosenbury's assertion that I "separat[e] race from relationship," I
view them as intrinsically linked, highlighting how relationship shapes and forms racial identity or
race. Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 790.
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use, too) has made me begin to wonder whether a new term like
"interraciality" may not be a matter of choice, but instead a matter of
necessity. At several points in their essays, Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury address discrimination based on a couple's "interraciality," but
not once do they cast it as "discrimination because of race"; instead, they use
the phrases "discrimination because of interracial relationships" or
"discrimination on the basis of their interracial relationships," even in cases
where they are referring to sections in which I am highlighting how being
part of an interracial collective alters the individual racial identities of
persons in such families. 76 In such situations, I am explicitly discussing
factual scenarios and examples in a way that pushes for greater recognition
that these claims are "because of race" cases, even as the "race" in those
situations does not fit within our usual fixed categories of race. For example,
I write:
What about those cases where the harassing conduct is solely
focused on the racial group of the plaintiffs spouse, not at all on
their relationship, and where any understanding of the plaintiff's
harassment claim would have to be predicated upon an acceptance
of an actual shift in racial identity for him, for example, a shift in
the plaintiff's identity from white to nonwhite, much like Dalmage
has explained about her own racial identity? Shouldn't these
discrimination claims also be viable? Wouldn't they also advance
the purposes of Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws,
especially in situations where there was no employee of the
targeted race in the workplace to bring the claim? Recognizing
such claims would not only allow the "nonwhite, white" person to
have the harm to them acknowledged by law, it also would protect
those whites who do not want to be unwilling participants in such
prejudiced environments. 77
On the one hand, I completely understand that Professors Chacon and
Rosenbury likely chose such phrasing to avoid confusion for readers who
may not fully understand how part of what I describe as "interraciality" is
"race discrimination." (After all, I made similar choices). On the other hand,
such a choice, particularly when viewed alongside the two scholars'
arguments against interraciality, supports my point about the difficulties that
many experience in understanding "race" as broadly as I, and Professors
Chacon and Rosenbury, would like for courts to do, suggesting that a shift in

76.
See, e.g., Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 732 (using the phrase "on the
basis of their interracial relationships" where "because of race" would have been a better fit);
Rosenbury, Marital Status and Privilege, supra note 3, at 778 (using the phrase "because of their
interracial relationships" where "because of race" would have been a better fit).
77.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG,

supra note I, at 260 ( emphasis added).
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language may not just be preferred, but required.
Finally, Professor Chacon astutely points out one major step or hurdle
that my approach would have to overcome in today's climate: our
Congress. 78 Worrying about the damage that could occur if a hostile
Congress revisits an antidiscrimination statute such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, she notes her preference to leave antidiscrimination
statutes as they are. 79 This point is a significant factor to consider.
Ultimately, who knows which one of us is right on the question of adding
"interraciality" as a covered class, or if any one of us is right at all?
III. IMAGINING NEW VIEWS

In their essays, Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, and
Robin Lenhardt take the virtues they see in According to Our Hearts and
enhance them, adding their insights on the implicit contributions that the
book makes to our understanding of law and social norms. In so doing, they
highlight the points that they found most moving and compelling in
According to Our Hearts, and they offer their insights on other unstated
lessons from the book. Although it may sound peculiar for me to say that I
learned much about my own book, including its substance, from outside
readers, that sentiment carries here. The readers' lessons rejuvenated my
senses, enlivening my views of According to Our Hearts and its breadth and
reach.
In fact, I often experienced this type of revitalization as I was
interviewing, reading, and listening to responses from the individuals in the
twenty-one subject-couples-all anonymous-who added so much soul and
meaning to According to Our Hearts. These amazing couples often gave me
a unique lens through which to understand the constraints of race and racism
on multiracial families, and the individuals within them. I particularly
remember how the comments of one survey participant named Fiona, 80 a
fifty-plus year-old black woman who is married to a white man, Peter,
dramatically fortified my understanding of not only the harmful effects of
Jim Crow segregation, but also the inherently violent and cruel nature of
such state-sponsored segregation. Speaking about the many social cues that
my subject-couples had received in their lives against interracial intimacy, I

78.
Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 734 ("A third reason to be wary of the
proposed change is that it requires Congress to reopen discussion of the antidiscrimination
provisions if they want to add a category. Given political retrenchment on equality issues in recent
years, it seems just as likely that the result would be a congressional narrowing of antidiscrimination
law once the topic was opened for discussion. Perhaps it is best in this political climate to leave these
particular laws alone.").
79.

Id.

80.

This name is a pseudonym.
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assert the following in According to Our Hearts:
For instance, Fiona described the first time that she learned and
understood what it meant to be black and white in our society and,
along with that, the clear lines of separation between blackness and
whiteness. She declared: "We were visiting my grandmother in
Jackson, Mississippi. I was about three or four years old. I went to
drink from a White water fountain that looked like the ones I drank
from in Chicago. My mother snatched me and exclaimed, 'That's
the White water fountain! Are you trying to get us killed?"' 81
Fiona's comment about her near life-threatening misstep as a toddler
has remained with me since I first learned about it, not just because it is a
harrowing and frightening account of the constant dangers that Blacks lived
under during the Jim Crow era, but also because of what it communicates
about the damage that black parents were forced to inflict upon their
children at such an early age. Fiona's comment made me think of my own
three children, and in particular, my now four-year-old (and then three-yearold) child. As any parent of young children understands, three-year-olds and
four-year-olds have their own minds. My mother-in-law often says, "You
cannot reason with a four-year-old." As a parent, I began to think about what
things I would have been forced to implicitly convey to my child to avoid
even the risk of near-death experiences like the three- or four-year-old Fiona
and her family in Mississippi. I thought about what I would have been
forced to explain to my four-year-old, and how I would have had to couch
my explanations in terms of clear-cut lines of race that could send only one
meaning to him. I thought about how many "why" questions would have
followed each of my sentences during my explanations and about how the
only message that my child could and would absorb from my lessons on Jim
Crow survival and my explanations about how the world racially operated
would have been implicit ones about his alleged inferiority, his allegedly
being less-than, despite any claims I made to the contrary about his own
worth to counteract these inherently soul-damaging lessons of survival.
Fiona's account of her childhood memory allowed me to see a Jim
Crow environment through my Jens as a parent, rather than as an imagined
target. Looking through this parental lens enabled me to more fully
appreciate the inherently violent nature of state-mandated segregation. It was
only through this lens that I began to truly see the wickedness and the
horrific violence of Jim Crow. My new view of Jim Crow's horrors that I
had uncovered involved seeing how white segregationists manipulated the
love of black parents to insure that black children absorbed messages of
inferiority, not just explicitly through "Coloreds Only" signs and physical
violence, but also implicitly through a parent or loved one's directions and

81.

0NWUACHJ-WILLIG, supra

note I, at 246.
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lessons to a child, beginning essentially from day one. The cruelty came not
just through the lynchings, beatings, and killings that forced parents to pass
on the survival skill of following Jim Crow rules to their children from the
very day that they could walk and possibly break those rules; it also came
through the fact that parents, in simply providing direction and guidance to
their children on how to survive (like all parents must do), were forced to
convey an implicit meaning of inferiority to their own children. It was only
then that I could fully appreciate the social cues that Fiona had to overcome
to love Peter 82 and, more so, fully acknowledge the value of
all the cues that my survey participants had received about strict
boundaries against interracial intimacy during their lives, (and of
how, they, when] ... faced with the same tug-of-war decision
about love and race that Leonard [Rhinelander had] encountered, ..
. still resisted the forces against them to follow their hearts in
deciding to whom they would commit themselves. 83
Similarly, the essays of Professors Abrams, Bridgeman, and Lenhardt
each opened my eyes in varying ways and on varying topics. I will pinpoint
segments of the essays by these three scholars that, like Fiona's words,
widened and brightened my view on an issue, thereby giving me a clearer
perspective on the reach of my own work. I will start with Professor
Abrams's essay, and then move to Professor Bridgeman's piece before
ending with Professor Lenhardt's paper.
Professor Abrams's analysis of the meanings of modem marriage, as
seen and interpreted through the many changes in annulment law over time,
expanded my view of how both Leonard and Alice may have been
expressing their own individual identities through their decisions to marry
each other. In her essay, Professor Abrams examines what annulment means
"culturally-and the goals of the people who seek it ... to understand how
marriage forges and alters people's identities." 84 Abrams notes that courts
have actually begun to "expand the 'essentials' doctrine in ways that stretch
it beyond recognition" by offering annulments based on arguments related to
"individuals' core personal identities, such as the desire to avoid being a
parent, sexual orientation, or national citizenship." 85 Professor Abrams

82.

This name is a pseudonym.

83.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG,

supra note I, at 248.

84.
Kerry Abrams, The End of"Annulment, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 681, 683 (2013)
[hereinafter Abrams, The End a/Annulment].
85.
Id. at 690; see also Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. I (2012) (arguing
that the reason for the proliferation of marriage fraud doctrines in more recent centuries are (I) an
increased availability of easy divorce, (2) the legalization and decreased social stigma of nonmarital
sex and childbearing, and (3) the increased use of marriage as an eligibility category for state and
federal benefits).
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posits that "[c]ourts' willingness to expand annulment law in this direction
may indicate a new understanding of the purpose of marriage." 86
Specifically, she argues that these expansions in annulment are indicative of
the way in which "marriage has taken on a new meaning, an identityproducing one, in which the recognition of a fraudulent marriage can harm
someone's personal integrity." 87 Marriage, she says, "can be more identityproducing" because marriage, after all, is self-expression, and "in some
ways[,] the ultimate self-expression." 88 Professor Abrams ends with
insightful examples of how the "newer" accepted bases for annulment are
tied more closely to contemporary understandings of identity. 89 She astutely
asserts:
If marriage is a project of personal self-fulfillment and expression,
then finding out that the person you married was never actually
physically attracted to you (because of sexual orientation) or used
to be a different gender could be remarkably destabilizing to one's
sense of self. If marriage is a joint project, in which goals and
desires specific to the couple can be brought to fruition, it is not
surprising that judges would find lying about the desire to
procreate to be just as important as lies about one's ability or
willingness to do so. And if marriage is central to a person's core
identity, finding out that your spouse married you only to obtain a
different identity-like U.S. citizenship-might feel like the
ultimate betrayal.

. . . This kind of fraud may be one of the purest examples of
using a spouse for ulterior motives, a kind of identity theft through
marriage. If marriage is anything today, it is a commitment to a
joint project-whatever that project may be. For someone seeking
an annulment today, the "end" or goal of annulment may be to
reclaim his or her pre-marital identity. 90
As Professor Abrams notes, the "identity-producing aspect of marriage
is a theme that threads its way through According to Our Hearts." 91
However, her analysis in The End ofAnnulment revealed to me that my view

86.

Abrams, The End ofAnnulment, supra note 84, at 690-91.

87.
Id. at 696; see also Keny Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 100 CALIF. L. REV. I (2012) (showing
how contemporary marriage law provides a gender-neutral form of marriage as citizenship in which
married people are expected to have their identities radically changed through marriage).
88.

Abrams, The End ofAnnulment, supra note 84, at 697.

89.

Id. at 702-03.

90.

Id. at 701-02.

91.

Id. at 698.
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of that aspect of marriage with regard to Leonard Rhinelander may have
been too one-sided. 92 For example, in According to Our Hearts, I express
surprise at survey participants' harsh criticisms of Leonard; for most of my
survey participants, the historical context under which the Rhinelander trial
occurred did not matter in their judgments of Leonard, and they generally
referred to him in a poor light, calling him a "weak" man, a "jerk," a
"coward," and a "gutless" person. 93 As I read Professor Abrams's paper, I
realized that my surprise at participants' reactions to Leonard occurred only
because I had focused so much on the Rhinelanders' failed love story,
looking at Alice and Leonard primarily as victims in a society that tore them
apart because of racism and classism instead of considering how their own
actions, specifically Leonard's, also may have been an expression of racial
identity (much like I did for so many other persons whom I discussed in the
book). 94 Professor Abrams's analysis of what the shifts in annulment signal
about marriage and its role in one's personal expression of identity brought
me much closer to viewing Leonard and Alice through the lens of Professor
Chacon, who "read the story of the Rhinelanders as an ill-fated liaison
between a social climber and a thoughtless, callow, and over-privileged
young white man who could not see the potentially destructive effect of
acting on his desires until it was too late." 95 In explaining her views on
Leonard and Alice, Professor Chacon asserts:
Even if I assume that Leonard Rhinelander was naive about either
Alice's race (a finding which the jury rejected in Rhinelander) or
of the consequences to both of them if her status as a non-white
woman became public, it is difficult for me to understand his
actions as anything other than an exercise of a remarkable degree
of privilege. I wonder what sort of bubble he was living in to think
that he could marry any person he chose without subjecting his
marriage and his partner to tremendous scrutiny and possible social
disapproval. And if he was not prepared to bear the obvious
92.
ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 241 ("Perhaps naively, when I first posed questions
about Alice and Leonard to my survey participants, I halfway expected that a few of them would
speak about Leonard's failure to stand up to his father within the context of the time period involved,
but only two of them ever did. When I thought more deeply about the couples themselves, I realized
that their largely unsympathetic responses to Leonard, even when taking the time period into account, were not surprising in light of their own experiences. For one thing, very few of the
participants in my survey had encountered much opposition from their families to their marriage or
commitment based on race. In fact, unlike Leonard during the 1920s, most of them came from
families that were supportive and happy that they had finally found true love in their lives.").
93.

Id. at 240.

94.
See generally id. at 1-117 (involving Part I of the book, which describes the failed love
story of the Rhinelanders); id. at 233-41 (involving Chapter Eight, which includes the subject
couples' reactions to Leonard).
95.

Chacon, Opening Our Hearts, supra note 8, at 726.
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costs-namely, being disinherited and socially ostracized by his
family and its social circle-then it is not at all clear to me why he
96
married Alice in the first place.
In The End of Annulment, Professor Abrams clarifies exactly how Professor
Chac6n's view is not one that should make her feel "curmudgeonly" at all.
In wondering how Alice and Leonard Rhinelander may have each been
expressing their individual identities through marriage, Professor Abrams
writes:
[F]or the Rhinelander couple, marriage may also have been a selfexpression of identity. Leonard may have been attempting to forge
a new identity for himself, independent of a wealthy family. Alice
may have been, consciously or not, attempting to stake her claim as
a "white" person in a world where with whiteness came the
possibility of wealth and respect. 97
When I begin to think of Alice and Leonard's actions and statements more
as individual expressions of their identity, rather than simple reactions to
thwarted love, I begin to see them, particularly Leonard, more like Professor
Chacon does, and less as pure victims of racism. After all, if Leonard viewed
his marriage to Alice as an explicit, personal statement about racial
hierarchies and his personal rejection of them, then I agree that his decision
to not stand beside his wife is quite thoughtless, callow, and weak because of
his refusal to stand by this powerful statement and his willingness to give in
to societal and familial pressures about race.
In tum, this view of Leonard makes me think of how, in our current
society where monoracial coupling is still the expectation, others may view
the act of marriage for any person in an interracial marriage as an affirmative
rejection of racial hierarchies, even if the individuals in the interracial couple
see their marriage as expressing love only, not any "political" statements. In
this sense, multiracial couples-here, too--have part of their voice taken
away from them, much like Alice, who never testified at trial, did.
Professor Bridgeman's essay builds upon the insights that I gained from
Professor Abrams' s The End ofAnnulment by examining how far we have to
go before we reach a place of equal value, and by explaining how
interraciality can help to disrupt the norms that are critical to reaching that
point of equal value. Professor Bridgeman highlights some of the ways in
which attitudes on interracial marriage can inform our understanding of how
close society is to equality, asserting that "if 37% of individuals would not
be fine with a family member marrying a person of a different race, it
suggests that despite significant progress, we have a ways to go before we

96.

Id.
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Abrams, The End ofAnnulment, supra note 84, at 698.
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reach a place of equal value." 98 She further contends that "disrupting our
current racial norms is a key component of moving towards the goal of equal
value." 99
One important means for disrupting these norms, Professor Bridgeman
contends, is through the concept of interraciality and the way in which it can
shift an individual's racial identity. Like many of the authors in this
colloquium did in their own essays, Professor Bridgeman specifically points
to my discussion of Professor Heather Dalmage's comments concerning how
her racial identity as a white person shifted after she married a black man
and began to experience different forms of discrimination that she had not
previously encountered. Professor Bridgeman wisely stresses that "it 1s
important not to confuse [interraciality] with integration." 100 She explains:
While integration is essential to foster interraciality, the concepts
the two words embody, at least as they are defined here, are not
interchangeable. As this Article conceives of each, integration
involves merely the mixing, on some level, of people of different
races. In contrast, interraciality involves the relationship of two or
more individuals of different races such that being part of the
interracial collective alters the sense of identity of all of those who
form part of the collective .
. . . For example, prior to marrying my mother, my white stepfather spent significant time in integrated settings and had friends
and acquaintances who were not white. However, it was not until
he married my mother and became involved in raising two black
children that he began to look closely at his own identity. It was
only then that he started questioning what it meant to be white and
to have a race. It was only then that his views on racial norms
began to significantly shift. 101
What was most striking and compelling about Professor Bridgeman's
essay, however, was her perspective on the different ways and speeds at
which interraciality may alter the identities of individuals within the same
family, and in her case, a monoracial child whose divorced mother remarried
a white man during her childhood, who then assisted in raising her within a
multiracial home. Because the experiences of children in multiracial families
was a topic that I had to leave for another book project due to limited space,

98.
Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, On Shifiing Hearts and Minds: lnterraciality, Equal Value, and
Equality, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 705, 714 (2013).
99.

Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
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Professor Bridgeman's experiences as a child particularly intrigued me. It
was interesting to see how strong and how deep the message of
monoraciality had been ingrained into her understanding of herself, a woman
with "mixed blood in [her] heritage on both sides of [her] family" and who
grew up in a multiracial family. 102 She explicated:
Until recently, if asked, I would not have hesitated to say I am
African American and that I was raised African American, despite
the fact that the step-father who helped raise me nearly all of my
life, who has served as my psychological father, and who is the
person I think of first as my father, is white. I would have said this
despite the fact that I grew up with two white step-sisters, a white
step-mother, and a white grandmother who was the only
grandmother I have ever known, not to mention many aunts,
uncles, and cousins who are also white. 103
But again, it was rather moving to see, as Professor Bridgeman noted, how
those once deeply entrenched norms became destabilized as she formed her
own multiracial family. Professor Bridgeman stated:
Being part of a close, interracial collective helps make such norms
visible. Interraciality can engender the questioning of such norms
in ways that are destabilizing, and in ways that cause the
individuals in the collective to recognize, to conceive of, and to
articulate identities that go beyond and run counter to those norms.
I saw this happen with my step-father as he was raising my brother
and me, and I now recognize it in myself, as I am in the midst of
raising my own multiracial children. Having to raise my own
children has caused me to reflect upon and question my own
identity. This reflection and questioning has caused my identity to
shift and has caused me to see differently aspects of my identity
that I had previously taken for granted. 104
Finally, Professor Lenhardt's response to According to Our Hearts
ignites an examination of "the structural elements that limit interracial
intimacy, families, and parenting in the United States," 105 and pushes for
further examinations of these structures. Professor Lenhardt particularly
focuses on my explication of the "placelessness" of multiracial families in
the country and my proposal for the addition of an "interraciality" category
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in anti-discrimination statutes. She declares:
While Onwuachi-Willig admittedly does not explicitly champion a
structure-based inquiry, this Article endeavors to show that this
discussion of placelessness and other aspects of her book lend
themselves nicely to a discussion of structural racism and its
impact on interracial families. Structuralism-a focus on "the
cumulative effect of institutional structures and systems on
outcomes for institutions, groups, and individuals"-has a great
deal to offer the study of the interracial family. This Article thus
suggests a point of intervention for scholars interested in bringing
structuralist insights into the study of race and family. 106
Professor Lenhardt examines the Rhinelander tale as one of "race and
space," highlighting the impacts of such structures on individual race
identity as well as marriage. She then "asks what a more intentional and
sustained focus on structural racial discrimination and its impact on
interracial couples and families would look like." 107 In analyzing the jury's
verdict in Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, she deftly looks beyond Alice's body
and family to inquire whether "the jurors empanelled in the Rhinelander
trial, which was held in Westchester County, were aware of [the racial]
dynamics [of Westchester County, New York, including the town in which
Alice lived]," whether the jurors "easily could have been influenced, even
before seeing Alice's bare breasts, by the racial information that the racial
boundaries of 1920s Westchester County communicated," or even whether
they marked Alice as black as a result of her work as a maid. 108
Professor Lenhardt calls for scholars to address "interracial intimacy
from an explicitly structural perspective .... " 109 In describing what this
research agenda would look like, Professor Lenhardt contends that it, among
other things, "must[] tak[e] a page from [According to Our Hearts']
playbook[ and] first seek answers to current challenges by better
understanding the past." 110 In so doing, Professor Lenhardt offers a few
examples of how scholars may undertake this project, including, but not
limited to, examining the relationship between anti-miscegenation laws and
school segregation; considering how space and race shape thoughts about
interracial families and parenting, such as the misidentification of black
mothers as the nannies of their multiracial children that I analyzed in
Chapter Six; and exploring "more closely other types of cross-racial
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relationships and the legal structures that inhibit or promote them," 111 such
as I began to do in Chapter Eight of According to Our Hearts. 112
It is difficult to add much to Professor Lenhardt's astute and inspiring
observations in her essay. She does an excellent job of laying out where we
as scholars may go from here in looking at interracial intimacies and, more
so, in proposing and adopting a structuralist approach for doing so. At a
minimum, Professor Lenhardt makes it clear to all of us that there is still
much work to be done, that there is still much to be learned, and that there is
still much to be discussed. She begins to widen the view and proffers many
new paths for us to explore.
IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it has been my honor to have the opportunity to learn
from Professors Kerry Abrams, Jacquelyn Bridgeman, Jennifer Chacon,
Robin Lenhardt, Laura Rosenbury, and Melissa Murray in this colloquium
on law and the multiracial family. The essays in this issue have sharpened
my understanding of the Rhinelanders, race, law, privilege, and family often
in ways that I had not anticipated. For those readers who are perusing and/or
studying According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law
of the Multiracial Family (hopefully, tons of you), I invite you to join us in
this room of essays, this room with many views of the book, its messages, its
significance, and our hearts.
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